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Who Should Read This Paper?   Parties that may find this paper of interest include 
government agencies considering the deployment of data mining technologies in the 
counter-terrorism context, policy makers in the field of national security, counter-terrorism 
and law enforcement agencies, bodies that oversee intelligence or national security 
activities, and non-governmental organizations focussed on the field of human rights or 
national security. 
 
Executive Summary 
  
1. Comprehensive assessments of the performance of data mining programmes, whether 
in the counter-terrorism context or other contexts, are generally not publicly available. 
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2. Despite the lack of evaluative information, some applications of data mining show 
promise, and one can intuitively assume that data mining is useful in performing 
traditional investigatory tasks.  
3. Where data mining is applied in the counter-terrorism context, however, there may be 
more acute risks of human rights violations than is the case in other contexts. 
4. Limiting the use of counter-terrorism data mining to that of an analytical tool in targeted 
investigations and to applications that do not rely on personal data would minimize the 
potential for human rights infringement.  
5. More public studies of and research on the performance of data mining programmes 
providing demonstrable results could help to establish a realistic view of the promise of 
data mining and open a dialogue on the most sensible manner in which it can be applied 
in the counter-terrorism context.  
 
Summary of Recommendations 
 
1. Governments should require rigorous testing of data mining products before 
implementing them for counter-terrorism purposes. 
1.1. Testing should be carried out on simulated data that reflects to the closest degree 
possible the forms and types of data to which the deployed product is intended to 
be applied. 
1.2. Testing should be performed by a competent body that is completely independent 
of the agency or agencies which would use the technology if it were to be deployed, 
and that body should possess the appropriate expertise in scientific evaluation and 
assessment methodology. 
1.3. Ideally, results of tests involving deployed technologies should be published for 
public review so that citizens may assess whether the technology represents a 
worthwhile investment of public funds. 
1.4. Only those data mining programmes that can demonstrate their effectiveness in 
the test setting should be allowed to be deployed 
2. Following implementation, programmes should be reviewed on a regular basis and 
monitoring mechanisms updated accordingly. 
3. Governments should establish parameters for the types of data that will be subject to 
data mining programmes or exercises. 
3.1. Parameters should be based on the minimum amount and types of personal data 
necessary to conduct the analysis for the aims that it seeks to achieve. 
3.2. Where a data mining programme is applied to personal data, use of the programme 
should be confined to the greatest extent possible to investigatory applications 
centring on known suspects and endeavour to comply with traditional standards 
governing government intrusion into the private life of individuals. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims to address the potential benefits and costs of data mining programmes as 
implemented for counter-terrorism purposes.  These issues are of interest on at least two 
levels.  First, the effectiveness of data mining programmes is of relevance from the 
perspective of counter-terrorism agencies. Any efforts aimed at combating terrorism 
naturally face a limited set of resources.  The economic costs involved in building a new 
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system for data mining can include materiel (hardware, etc.), software, labour in 
programming, systems engineering, testing, and personnel training.  There will also be 
maintenance costs involved once the system is in place.  If the system is not sufficiently 
effective, however, it will not provide the desired return on investment (“ROI”).  In addition 
to economic costs, there is also the economics of human attention.  Thus, the time spent 
working on producing, evaluating, and investigating the results of data mining efforts can 
divert human attention—whether at the level of analysts or operative agents—from other 
areas of interest. 
 
Second, the effectiveness of counter-terrorism data mining programmes is of relevance for 
assessing the compatibility of such programmes with international human rights standards.  
Under international human rights law, any government measure that interferes with a 
human right has to conform to the principle of proportionality.  Clearly, if a measure that 
affects a human right has little to no benefit toward the accomplishment of its aim, it cannot 
be proportionate.  We will address the issue of proportionality in relation to counter-
terrorism data mining in more detail in Deliverable D08.3. 
 
In trying to measure effectiveness, we face difficulties on a number of levels.  First of all, if 
we seek to determine a kind of ROI or perform a cost-benefit analysis, some of the costs—
such as human attention—are not easily quantifiable.  Not to mention the fact, that even 
straightforward economic costs for specific programmes may be difficult if not impossible to 
obtain or assess in a comprehensive fashion.1  Assessing the benefits is equally difficult: 
Foiled plots are not necessarily always reported.  Of those pre-emptive arrests that are 
publicized, it is generally impossible to know whether data mining played a role and, if so, 
what role it played exactly.  Similarly, comprehensive figures on the success or failure of 
particular programmes are not available.  Public knowledge of government use of data 
mining programmes—even if details are not revealed—may also have some deterrent effect.  
As in other contexts, the existence and force of a deterrent effect is difficult to determine.   
 
Additionally, an issue that is of central importance concerns how data mining technologies 
are implemented and in what contexts.  This factor plays a role both in terms of the benefits 
and costs.  As we will see below, certain methods will prove more effective in certain 
contexts than others.  Furthermore, methods that do prove initially successful may require 
constant adjustments in order to tune them to newly available data—which may also reflect 
changes in the modus operandi of terrorists.  Another consideration is the amount of data 
on which a data mining operation is performed, not to mention whose data is made 
available to the operation.  The former has a direct correlation to the number of “failures” 
that a data mining programme will yield, the latter has an impact on whom will be 
implicated by data mining programmes.  Targeted approaches would intuitively seem less 
likely to have an adverse impact on innocents.  These considerations remind us that it is 
impossible to make generalized appraisals of the use of data mining for counter-terrorism 
purposes in the abstract; rather, any final assessments must be context-specific.   
 
This paper is organized as follows:  First, we will discuss what data mining is in Section 2, 
referring back to our definition and discussion in D08.1.  In Section 3, we will look at the 
                                                     
1
 In some instances, the budget figures of counter-terrorism programmes are considered classified 
information.  See, e.g., Office of the Director of National Intelligence, DNI Releases Budget Figure for 
FY 2012 Appropriations Requested for the National Intelligence Program, ODNI News Release No. 4-
11 (2011).  See also U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Secure Flight Certification”, GAO-10-
535R (2010) at 6–7 on the difficulties of providing a reliable life-cylcle cost estimate for the Secure 
Flight programme.  
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benefits of data mining and examine its track record in other contexts.  Turning to the 
application of data mining in the counter-terrorism context, we examine the aims for which 
data mining programmes have been proposed in this context.  On that basis, we develop a 
typology of programmes in order to distinguish aspects pertaining to the effectiveness and 
human impact of different types of programmes.  We then look at reports of the 
performance of data mining programmes in the counter-terrorism context.  In Section 4, we 
turn to the costs connected to the use of data mining in this context.  Then, we will seek to 
weigh these positive and negative aspects in Section 5.  Lastly, conclusions and a set of 
recommendations are offered in Section 6. 
2. What is Data Mining? 
 
In our first deliverable, D08.1, we cursorily addressed the issue of defining and describing 
data mining.  There, we touched upon the fact that, even among practitioners in data 
mining, the term can have different meanings.  In D08.1, we provisionally adopted a very 
broad definition without actually attempting to formulate a formal definition, primarily 
because we were interested in examining a wide range of activities that had significant 
implications for human rights but might not fall within narrower definitions.  There we 
articulated our definition as “the use of information technology to attempt to derive useful 
knowledge from (usually) very large data sets”.  It is not necessary to articulate a definition 
here, although we acknowledge criticism that the original definition was too broad.2  
Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that the fuzziness of data mining as a concept makes 
any assessment of data mining in the abstract considerably more difficult.  In essence, data 
mining represents a variety of techniques that may be applied (with varying degrees of 
success) to a variety of different tasks.  The types of techniques applied are constantly being 
experimented with and expanded as the types of tasks for which these techniques are 
believed to be useful are also further explored.  Our initial survey revealed a number of 
different applications within the counter-terrorism context alone.   
 
Generally, data mining involves the application of one or more algorithms3 to a set of data to 
organize that data in a particular way, reveal relationships between data items, and/or 
assign some value to data items to indicate their significance to a particular query.  Well-
known applications of data mining include Google’s PageRank function which attempts to 
predict what webpage on the internet a search engine user is most interested in,4 Amazon’s 
profiling of customers to predict what books they may be interested in, and credit card 
monitoring which aims to identify potentially fraudulent uses of a client’s credit card.   
 
Data mining is often tied to the notion of profiling.5  Data mining may rely on a profile or 
model in order to find items within a database that most closely match that profile.  This 
                                                     
2
 R. Barquin, “To Data Mine or Not to Data Mine in the Fight Against Terrorism”, BeyeNETWORK, 
24 August 2010, http://www.b-eye-network.com/channels/1020/view/14227. 
3
 For more information on specific algorithms, readers may be interested to consult, e.g., B. Anrig, W. 
Browne and M. Gasson, “The Role of Algorithms in Profiling”, in M. Hildebrandt and S. Gutwirth 
(eds.), Profiling the European Citizen (Springer, 2008).  “An alorithm [sic] is like a recipe: given some 
input it describes the steps to be performed in order to generate the output.”  Ibid., n. 45, at 65. 
4
 However, the core PageRank function is is supplemented by measures aimed at counteracting 
attempts to game search results.  See, e.g., Google’s Webmaster Guidelines, available at 
http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=35769 (version of 
12/09/2010) (“The spam reports we receive are used to create scalable algorithms that recognize and 
block future spam attempts.” “...avoid links to web spammers or ‘bad neighborhoods’ on the web, as 
your own ranking may be affected adversely by those links.”). 
5
 In the law enforcement setting, profiling has been defined as “the systematic association of sets of 
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type of data mining falls within what is termed “supervised” methods.  For instance in the 
area of fraud detection, data analysis will rely on a model based upon past instances of fraud 
that are known.  Unsupervised methods, on the other hand, may more closely resemble the 
kind of “data dredging” or fishing expedition exercises with which data mining has often 
been associated in popular accounts.  Unsupervised uses of data mining may simply look for 
any existing patterns in data or for unusual data items—i.e. “outliers”.6  A pattern identified 
in data may in turn be used to generate a profile.  This exercise may be done by applying 
unsupervised data mining on a data set that contains known items of the type being sought.  
It is then possible to examine what elements, if any, distinguish those items from other 
items in the data set. 
 
In many circles, the term “profiling” automatically conjures up negative associations with 
racial or ethnic profiling.  It is important to note that profiling need not involve consideration 
of any personal attributes whatsoever.  An online bookstore, for instance, may create 
profiles of its customers’ book-purchasing habits—such as what genres tend to be 
purchased, at what times purchases tend to be made, and how much money tends to be 
spent per purchase—without collecting information on the gender, race, national origin, or 
religious affiliation of those customers.  Nonetheless, there is continued interest in using 
characteristics such as race, national origin, and religion as a basis for security-related 
measures.7  Additionally, automated profiling tools currently applied in the counter-
terrorism context within some Western states likely include consideration of at least 
nationality.8  However, it is also important to note that data mining is not synonymous with 
profiling.  Data mining may be used to conduct profiling exercises, but it may also be applied 
in other manners.   
 
The distinction between supervised and unsupervised methods reveals that data mining may 
be applied in either a directed or undirected manner.  In other words, data mining may be 
part of a highly designed approach in which the user generally knows what kind of 
information he or she is looking for.  The data mining application is then designed specifically 
in an attempt to reveal that kind of information.  On the other hand, data mining may also 
be used in an exploratory fashion by simply applying stock algorithms to data sets to see 
what results are produced.  This sort of undirected use of data mining always carries with it 
the risk that the results it produces will be obvious, uninteresting, or irrelevant.9 
 
3. Benefits 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
physical, behavioural or psychological characteristics with particular offences and their use as a basis 
for making law-enforcement decisions.” M. Scheinin, “Implementation of General Assembly 
Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council": Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism”, A/HRC/4/26 (2007) at 33.   
6
 See R. J. Bolton and D. J. Hand, “Statistical Fraud Detection: A Review” (2002) 17:3, Statistical 
Science, 235–55 at 236. 
7
 See, e.g., “Our view on airport screening: Why Israel's air security model wouldn't work in the USA”, 
USA Today, 21 December 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2010-12-22-
editorial22_ST_N.htm.  
8
 Following the Christmas Day bomb attempt on a Detroit-bound flight, several Western nations voiced 
the opinion that certain nationals should be subjected to higher security scrutiny, suggesting that 
nationality represented a factor for risk assessment.  See DETECTER Deliverable D06.3, n. 154 and 
accompanying text. 
9
 Cf. M. DeRosa, Data Mining and Data Analysis for Counterterrorism (26 June 2009), p. 3. 
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As a form of IT-supported data analysis, data mining promises to provide similar benefits to 
that of other forms of IT-based data analysis.  Perhaps first and foremost is the benefit of 
processing speed.  Today’s capabilities in terms of digital storage capacities and processing 
speeds make it possible to store and retrieve large amounts of information and perform 
calculations much faster than human beings and without human error.  As one example of 
modern computing power, the FBI claimed that the deployment of the technology behind its 
Investigative Data Warehouse had reduced the time to perform certain tasks from 32,000 
hours to half an hour.10  
 
The use of data mining has traditionally been connected with investigating very large 
amounts of data.  As businesses of all kinds began to accumulate databases of information 
pertaining to sales, customer relations, spending, etc., data mining promised a method for 
analyzing these growing bodies of data so that it could serve to better understand and 
improve business processes.  The problem, of course, was not limited to the business world.  
In a seminal 1996 article, Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro, and Smyth referenced the increasing 
size and depth of databases in the realms of medicine and the astronomical sciences in 
particular.11  They indicated that, even at that time, databases containing millions of items 
were “becoming increasingly common” and each item might have as many as hundreds or 
thousands of different fields of information associated with it.12   
 
Related to this promise of providing analysis of large data sets is the emerging ability of data 
mining programmes to provide graphical representations of trends, patterns in or 
connections among data.  In this way, it is hoped that these special visualization tools can 
support analysis by providing a quick picture of informational relevance. 
 
One aspect for which data mining is renowned and that distinguishes it from other forms of 
data processing, however, is its ability to uncover relationships or patterns within data that 
investigators may not even think to inquire after.  A much-cited example from the field of 
market basket analysis was the discovery that, at one particular store, beer and diapers were 
often purchased together within a certain span of hours.13   
 
3.1. Performance in Other Contexts  
 
A number of data mining success stories have been reported in contexts other than counter-
terrorism: 
 
 Marketing 
 
Credit card company American Express reportedly saw a 10-15% increase in credit 
card use after implementing a system for purchase analysis.14 
 
 Credit Card Fraud 
                                                     
10
 Chiliad. (2006). Chiliad Success Story: Federal Bureau of Investigation. Retrieved November 23, 
2009, from http://www.chiliad.com/docs/ChiliadCaseStudy_FBI.pdf, p. 3. 
11
 U. Fayyad, G. Piatetsky-Shapiro and P. Smyth, “From Data Mining to Knowledge Discovery in 
Databases” (1996) 17(3), AI Magazine, 37–54 at 38. 
12
 Ibid., p. 38. 
13
 See M. Whitehorn, “The parable of the beer and diapers”, The Register, 15 August 2006, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/08/15/beer_diapers/.  
14
 Ibid., p. 38. 
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Amy Belasco of the Congressional Research Service examined a system described in 
a 1999 article that was designed to detect credit card fraud.  She observed that 
when the developers combined different algorithms they were able to detect up to 
50% of fraudulent transactions with the system.15  In 2003, it was reported that 
credit card issuers U.S. Bancorp and Wachovia had reduced incidents of fraudulent 
credit card use by 70% since 1992.16  At that time, credit union insurer Credit Union 
National Association was reportedly including the use of such fraud detection 
software as one requirement for credit unions to qualify for insurance.17 
 
 Telecommunications 
 
In the late 90s, U.S. telecommunications provider AT&T faced a billing scam in which 
customers who visited a Moldovan pornography website had software 
surreptitiously installed on their computers.  The software would disconnect the 
connection to AT&T and dial an expensive toll number in Moldova.  By mining its 
database of call data, AT&T together with the Moldovan authorities was able to 
locate the actors behind the scheme.18 
 
 Medicine 
 
Drug-producer Novartis reportedly used data mining tools to analyze cases of infant 
leukaemia.  Its findings suggested that instances of the disease in infants could be 
grouped into three different categories, providing an indication that three different 
types of treatment might be called for.19 
 
 Law Enforcement 
 
Joyce Knowlton, an investigator at the Stillwater State Correctional Facility in 
Minnesota used i2, Inc.’s Analyst Notebook product to uncover a drug smuggling 
ring that was operating within the prison.  Knowlton entered prisoner call record 
data into the software, which revealed a pattern of calls between prisoners and a 
recent parolee.  By comparing the call patterns with prisoner financial records, she 
was able to determine a pattern of money flows.  On this basis, she began to 
monitor the telephone conversations of certain inmates and ascertained that they 
were using coded messages in connection with the drug smuggling activities.20  
 
                                                     
15
 A. Belasco, “Total Information Awareness Programs: Funding, Composition, and Oversight Issues”, 
RL31786 (March 21, 2003) at CRS-16..  There were of course also a significant number of false 
positives.  We will discuss this aspect further below.  The system she refers to is described in Philip K. 
Chan, Wei Fan, Andreas L. Prodromidis, and Salvatore J. Stolfo (1999) Distributed Data Mining in 
Credit Card Fraud Detection, available at http://cs.fit.edu/~pkc/papers/ieee-is99.pdf.  
16
 O. Port, ‘Smart Tools: Companies in health care, finance, and retailing are using artificial-
intelligence systems to filter huge amounts of data and identify suspicious transactions’ (Spring 2003), 
Business Week, available at http://www.businessweek.com/bw50/content/mar2003/a3826072.htm.  
17
 Ibid. 
18
 J. Markoff, “Taking Spying to Higher Level, Agencies Look for More Ways to Mine Data”, New 
York T imes, 25 February 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/25/technology/25data.html?ei=5088.  
19
 O. Port, ‘Smart Tools: Companies in health care, finance, and retailing are using artificial-
intelligence systems to filter huge amounts of data and identify suspicious transactions’ (Spring 2003), 
Business Week, available at http://www.businessweek.com/bw50/content/mar2003/a3826072.htm.  
20
 Ibid. 
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The analysis of PNR and other traveller data, such as “Advanced Passenger 
Information” data, has also reportedly been instrumental in ferreting out 
international drug smuggling.  In the case of US v. McKenzie,21 for example, the 
defendant was approached by federal drug enforcement officials solely on the basis 
of the fact that his PNR data fit the drug courier profile.  The defendant in Lewis v. 
Texas22 was referred to local Customs agents at Dallas/ Fort Worth International 
Airport on the basis of his travel patterns, the fact that he paid cash for his flight, 
and was believed to be related to another Lewis who had been arrested for 
transporting heroin into the US.23  The EU Commission has also cited examples 
where human traffickers were uncovered by linking them to false documents and 
where drug smugglers were exposed on the basis of their use of stolen credit card 
numbers to purchase flights.24 
 
Law enforcement officials in eastern Virginia used data mining to identify when and 
where complaints about random gunfire were most likely to occur around the time 
of the New Year’s Eve holiday.  The analysis was used to plan police deployment for 
the 2003-2004 holiday.  The initiative reportedly saw a 47% decrease in random 
gunfire complaints on New Year’s Eve and a 26% decrease over the course of the 
two-day holiday.25  The number of guns seized over the holiday period also 
increased from 13 in the previous year to 45 within the course of the initiative.26  
These gains were registered despite the fact that fewer police were deployed over 
the holiday period as part of the initiative’s targeted strategy.  As a result, the 
initiative saw savings of 15,000 USD in personnel costs.27 
  
 Anti-Money Laundering 
 
The field of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) overlaps with that of counterterrorism 
since AML systems are also used to identify terrorist financing.  In 1990, the US 
Department of the Treasury established the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN) as a support unit for state and federal law enforcement.  Its purpose was to 
provide information and analysis and identify targets for investigation in the field of 
money laundering and financial crimes.28  FinCEN employs an automated analysis 
system known as the FinCEN Artificial Intelligence System (FAIS) for these 
purposes.29  In a 1995 report, the Congressional Office for Technology Assessment 
wrote that the system had had “some clear successes” but the true extent to which 
FAIS had demonstrated its usefulness was unclear.30  In 2003, however, the General 
                                                     
21
 No. CR 08-1669, slip op., 2010 WL 1795173 (D. N.M. April 13, 2010). 
22
 No. 05-00-01204-CR, 2001 WL 946818 (Tex. App. Aug. 22, 2001). 
23
 It was later determined, however, that he bore no relation to the other Lewis in question.  Ibid., note 
2. 
24
 European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Paper: Impact Assessment”, SEC(2011) 132 at 
12. 
25
 C. McCue, “Data Mining and Predictive Analytics: Battlespace Awareness for the War on 
Terrorism” (2005) 13:1&2, Defense Intelligence Journal, 47–63 at 264. 
26
 Ibid., p. 264. 
27
 Ibid., p. 264. 
28
 Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, “Information Technologies for Control of Money 
Laundering”, OTA-ITC-630 (September 1995) at 43. 
29
 Ibid., p. 44. 
30
 Ibid., p. 46.  The report states: “In spite of some clear successes, evaluation of FinCEN’s help to law 
enforcers is difficult. FinCEN itself has little direct feedback from clients and thus little knowledge of 
the results of its referrals. Some field level law enforcement agents are skeptical; some told OTA that 
they have not been aware of any assistance from the agency. IRS, Customs, DEA, and FBI agents who 
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Counsel of the Department of the Treasury indicated that FAIS had supported 2,692 
terrorism investigations and had proactively generated 519 case referrals to law 
enforcement since 11 September 2001.31 
 
These anecdotes represent just a select few examples.  Colleen McCue32 and Christopher 
Westphal33 provide other illustrations of how data mining may be applied in the law 
enforcement and security contexts.  “Case studies” and “client testimonials” can also 
generally be found on the websites of any data mining technology provider.34  Hard numbers 
with regard to outcomes or quantifiable improvements, however, are rarely cited and are 
almost never provided in extensive detail. 
 
3.2. Aims of Data Mining in the Counter-Terrorism Context 
 
As with enterprise management as noted above, intelligence and investigatory work in the 
field of counter-terrorism also faces the problem of information overload.35  One of the 
primary themes of the findings of the 9/11 Commission was that information pertaining to 
the unfolding of the 9/11 plot was available within intelligence files and databases, but that 
analysts had failed to put all the information together.36  Thus, in the same way that it was 
able to assist businesses in analyzing internal information, data mining seemed to offer the 
ability to bring such intelligence information together quickly and automatically to the 
benefit of overwhelmed analysts. 
 
In at least some instances, the use of data mining in intelligence and law enforcement 
merely represents the application of information technology to the same tasks that such 
agencies have traditionally performed in the past.37  Thus, data mining may allow these 
agencies to work in a much faster, more efficient, and perhaps more organized manner than 
in the past.  The ability of data mining to reveal associations that analysts might not think to 
inquire after may have also offered some hope that data mining would not only assist in 
                                                                                                                                                        
have worked “on the street” or mounted active operations told OTA that they relied much more heavily 
on their own agencies’ intelligence units, on undercover agents, or on tips from informants. However, 
there may be reasons for this; leads generated by FinCEN may be passed through higher levels of a 
user agency to its agents without being identified as to source. FinCEN information may be discounted 
or ignored by some agents who are not used to dealing with that kind of data. Some agents who talked 
with OTA had not been on the street for several years, and FinCEN’s most sophisticated products have 
been introduced in the last year or two. Higher level comments may well be intended to protect an 
agency’s own image and budget.”  Ibid. 
31
 Counterterror Initiatives in the Terror Finance Program: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003) (Written Testimony of David D. Aufhauser, 
General Counsel, U.S. Department of the Treasury). 
32
 C. McCue, Data Mining and Predictive Analysis: Intelligence Gathering and Crime Analysis 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier/Butterworth-Heinemann, 2007). 
33
 C. Westphal, Data mining for intelligence, fraud &  criminal detection: Advanced analytics & 
information sharing technologies (Boca Raton , FL: CRC Press, 2009). 
34
 See, e.g., http://www.acl.com/customers/success_stories.aspx; http://www.spss.com/success/.  
35
 See, e.g., McCue, supra note 25, 48, 50.; McCue, supra note 32, p. 32. 
36
 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, (Washington, 
2004). 
37
 See K. A. Taipale, “Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of 
Data” (2003 / 2004), Columbia Science and Technology Law Review, 2 at 23–25. 
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performing traditional investigation tasks but could uncover connections or leads that 
traditional techniques would not.38 
 
Based on our findings in D08.1, there are a number of objectives that law enforcement, 
security agencies, and intelligence agencies hope to accomplish through data mining.  One 
such objective concerns the discovery of terrorists and terrorist networks.  Both of the two 
most renowned programmes in the US that came to be strongly associated with the words 
“data mining”—TIA39 and MATRIX40—sought, at least in part, to perform this function.  
Another of the most renowned programmes in this context, the German Rasterfahndung,41 
also had this objective.  Intelligent flight screening measures, such as those involved in the 
US Automated Targeting System42 and Secure Flight,43 represent yet another form of data 
mining which seeks to identify terrorists in real time.   
 
A second objective that is sought through the use of data mining is the generation of 
profiles—in the flight screening context, based on travel or other behavioural patterns that 
are then applied to travellers.44   
 
A third objective which counter-terrorist data mining seeks to achieve is the assessment of 
risks.  This might take the form of threat detection systems, such as automated analysis or 
specialized filtering of communications—for example the NSA’s programme45—or the 
automated analysis of open source materials such as news articles in order to predict when 
and where attacks will take place and ideally by whom they are being orchestrated.46  Threat 
detection may also involve the analysis of video data to detect emerging threats in real time 
or simply identify “suspicious” behaviour.   The FP7 project SAMURAI47 includes this kind of 
application of data mining to video data to detect “abnormal behaviour” as it is recorded by 
security cameras.  Additionally risk assessment may be geographical, using maps of criminal 
or other activity of interest to predict where future terrorist activity may occur.   
 
A fourth objective which the use of data mining seeks to achieve is the provision of analytic 
assistance, for instance through the automated prioritization of information48 or through 
                                                     
38
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M. DeRosa, Data Mining and Data Analysis for Counterterrorism (March 2004), p. 11. 
45
 See e.g., Complaint, Hepting v. AT&T, Corp., (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/att-complaint.pdf. 
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 This function could take a number of forms.  One example are operations typically performed by 
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visual representations of data.  Examples are the Genoa II project within TIA,49 NSA’s NIMD 
programme,50 and the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Insight Smart Discovery.51    
 
On this basis, we have established a typology of four applications of data mining in the 
counter-terrorism context: 
 
1. Discovery of terrorists and terrorist networks  
2. Profile Generation 
3. Risk Assessment  
4. Analytic Aids 
 
This typology is not intended to be absolutely comprehensive or exclusive.  As noted above, 
new techniques and applications are being developed all the time.  Therefore, even if this list 
represents an accurate reflection of current data mining applications in the counter-
terrorism context, additional types of applications may be developed in the future. 
3.3. Performance in Counter-Terrorism 
 
As we noted above, it is difficult to find evidence of instances where data mining 
programmes provided the key toward the foiling of a terrorist plot, the arrest of a terrorist 
or other intervention on the part of authorities.  Perhaps the best figures are available for 
the German Rasterfahndung since it was subjected to judicial review and the court’s 
reasoning is recorded in a published opinion.  That programme appears to have been more 
or less a complete failure.  It must be pointed out, however, that the Rasterfahndung 
appears to represent a rather crude form of data mining in which information technology 
probably only played a very minor role.  Nonetheless, there is evidence that US authorities 
followed the same line of thinking, and the State-based programme, the MATRIX, may have 
begun with a similar design in mind.52  Reports of other similarly crude forms of investigation 
have also been reported in US media.53  That a data mining programme is linked to a 
particular instance of success in the media or otherwise in a public source is extremely rare. 
 
Below, we outline some of the instances in which information concerning the performance 
of a specific programme has been revealed in publicly available sources. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
particular level of correspondance with an established profile. 
49
 See D08.1, § 2.2.4. 
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Rasterfahndung 
 
According to publicly available sources, the Rasterfahndung ultimately involved trawling 
through the data of some 8.3 million people—over 10 percent of the German population.54  
The Rasterfahndung involved a profile-based search through various databases and data 
sets.  The profile was likely based on the individuals involved in the 9/11 hijacking55 and was 
generated by a coordinating group composed of officials from the various states (Länder) of 
Germany that was headed by the Federal Criminal Police Office and featured representatives 
from Federal Border Control, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, and 
the Federal Intelligence Agency.56  The profile consisted of the following characteristics:  
male, between 18 and 40 years of age, student or former student, Muslim, with place of 
birth in or nationality of one of certain specific countries that had predominantly Muslim 
populaces.57  Among the databases that were searched were university databases, 
residential registration offices,58 and the national alien registry.59  The search conducted by 
the local agencies reportedly identified 31,988 “records” that were reported to the Federal 
Criminal Police Office.60  The data that was reported in these records varied from state to 
state and the particular source from which it was acquired.  In North Rhine-Westphalia, for 
instance, data delivered from residential registration offices included: first name and 
surname, name at birth, place of birth, nationality, address, any secondary residences, 
religion, marital status, children, the tax office that handled the individual’s tax statements, 
date on which residence was established, date on which the individual moved out of the 
registration office’s jurisdiction.61  Records from universities and other institutions of higher 
education included the individual’s field of study.62 
 
In at least one case, it was later discovered that some of the individuals named in these 
records had been mistakenly included.  The state of North Rhine-Westphalia, for instance, 
subsequently determined that a total of 1,187 of the individuals whose data had been 
passed on to the federal authorities did not actually match all the profile characteristics.63  
Data from these records was cross-referenced with other data sets, which reportedly 
included files concerning the holders of pilot’s licenses and individuals who were subjected 
to background checks for handling radioactive substances.64  Whenever the Federal Criminal 
Police Office determined that someone within the cross-referenced data sets matched an 
individual within the set of 31,988 records, that individual was put into a “results” file that 
was made available to the state criminal agencies.65  Reportedly, the results file ultimately 
held information on 1,689 individuals who were subject to closer investigation by German 
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police.66  Ultimately, the Rasterfahndung did not result in even a single criminal indictment 
for terrorism-related offences.67  
 
CAPPS II 
 
CAPPS II was a proposed airline passenger pre-screening programme that was intended to 
be administered by the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and replace the 
CAPPS I screening that was being carried out by commercial airlines.68  After data mining 
programmes such as TIA and CAPPS II had gained significant media attention, the US 
Congress mandated in 2003 that the Government Accountability Office (GAO)69 investigate 
CAPPS II and ensure that it met eight criteria.70  One criterion required the TSA to 
demonstrate that it ”has stress-tested and demonstrated the efficacy and accuracy of all 
search tools in CAPPS II and has demonstrated that CAPPS II can make an accurate predictive 
assessment of those passengers who may constitute a threat to aviation”.71  In its 2004 
Report on CAPPS II, the GAO indicated that several goals had not yet been met, including 
that TSA had not yet ”stress tested and demonstrated the accuracy and effectiveness of all 
search tools to be used by CAPPS II”.72  Notably, this statement includes no mention of 
whether the demonstration of the threat assessment aspects of CAPPS II were still 
outstanding.  It is thus unclear whether this omission indicates that this objective was met or 
was still considered to be a part of the other testing of system performance which was yet to 
be done. 
 
The development of CAPPS II was cancelled in 2004.  It is unknown whether any concerns 
about the proposed system’s effectiveness that may have existed played any role in the 
abandonment of the project.  In a 2005 report, the GAO indicates that the programme was 
discontinued due to ”a variety of delays and challenges”.73  Currently, the GAO website 
heralds as one of its recent accomplishments ”[p]rompting the saving of over $300 million 
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Stat. 1137, 1155-56 (2003). 
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http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04385.pdf, at 4. 
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from the cancellation of the Transportation Security Administration’s CAPPS II Program.”74  
This statement seems to suggest that investment in the CAPPS II project would have been in 
some sense wasteful.75  In its 2008 report on data mining and privacy, the US National 
Research Council noted ”data mining for credit scoring is widely acknowledged as an 
extremely successful application of data mining, while the various no-fly programs (e.g., 
CAPPS II) have been severely criticized for their high rate of false positives.”76  
 
Secure Flight 
 
Secure Flight is the flight screening system currently in place in the United States.77  Once it 
emerged that the TSA had begun work on Secure Flight in lieu of CAPPS II, Congress renewed 
the same set of requirements the following year for “CAPPS II or Secure Flight or other 
follow on/successor programs”, adding two additional requirements.78  The mandate was 
then renewed for each successive year through 2009.79  Accordingly, the GAO attempted to 
evaluate Secure Flight and verify that it fulfilled the ten conditions over the course of that 
time period.  Two of those conditions related directly to the issue of Secure Flight’s 
effectiveness.  The first concerned an assessment of the extent of false positives, and the 
other concerned the performance of “stress testing” and testing of the efficacy and accuracy 
of Secure Flights “search tools”.80  The GAO eventually reported that nine of the ten 
conditions had been “generally achieved” in April 2009, which included both conditions 
related to technical effectiveness.81  It is unclear from the GAO 2009 Report, however, to 
what extent the GAO was directly involved in testing the efficacy of the system.  A GAO 
official has confirmed that employees of the GAO observed tests of the system.82  Yet, it 
appears that the GAO also relied on statements from TSA officials that declared that the 
system was performing up to established parameters.  For instance the GAO reports that 
“TSA officials stated that they tested the system’s false-positive performance during Secure 
Flight’s parallel testing with selected air carriers in January 2009 and found that the false-
positive rate was consistent with the established target and program’s goals.”83  
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Significantly, neither the GAO nor Congress set the “established target” for false positives,84 
suggesting that this benchmark was internally established. 
 
With respect to the third condition, the GAO went into further detail concerning testing 
carried out by the TSA.  According to the report, the TSA conducted a series of tests of the 
watchlist matching capabilities of Search Flight, enlisting the support of a third party 
contractor who was an expert in watchlist matching.85  The contractor generated a 
simulated watchlist and a simulated passenger list using software and relying on the 
expertise of analysts and linguists.86  The passenger list consisted of about 12,000 records, of 
which approximately 1,500 represented intended matches to records on the simulated 
watchlist.87  In these tests, the Secure Flight system did not identify all the matches that the 
contractor had.88  In other words, the system had generated a higher number of false 
negatives.  This result was attributed to the fact that the contractor had used a wider date 
range for matching birth dates than the Secure Flight system did.  However, officials from 
TSA’s Office of Intelligence reviewed the test results and determined that the additional 
false negatives “did not pose an unacceptable risk to aviation security.”89  It was additionally 
thought that adding flexibility to the date matching in order to reduce the number of false 
negatives would also raise the rate of false positives unacceptably.90  The GAO report makes 
no mention of false positives encountered in the testing.  It is unclear whether this fact is an 
indication that no false positives were generated in the tests.  In testimony from 2005, Paul 
Rosenzweig, then acting Chairman of the Department of Homeland Security’s Data Privacy 
and Integrity Advisory Committee, suggested that watchlist matching under the old system 
operated by airline carriers had a match rate of roughly 2%, meaning that on average 35,000 
travellers in the US would be flagged for additional scrutiny each day.  Rosenzweig indicated 
that the Secure Flight system promised to bring that rate down to 0.8% (14,000 travellers 
per day on average).91 
 
In addition to testing accuracy, TSA was also required to perform “stress testing” and 
“performance testing” of Secure Flight.  The latter was to assess that the system would still 
be able to function properly under the levels of data flow and varying conditions that might 
be experienced during day-to-day operation.92  Stress testing, on the other hand, was to 
assess the system’s ability to handle rate volumes of data beyond the performance 
requirements that had been defined for the system.93  Although the GAO was not satisfied in 
January 2009 that the testing that had been performed up to that time was adequate to 
fulfil the condition imposed by Congress, by May of that year, it reported that TSA had 
“completed performance testing and significantly stress tested the vetting system portion of 
Secure Flight.”94  It further reported that stress testing established that the vetting system 
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could successfully perform beyond the defined parameter of 10 names in 4 seconds.95  The 
Secure Flight programme received GAO certification on 5 April 2010 once the GAO was 
satisfied that the final condition concerning life-cycle cost estimates and programme plans 
had been generally achieved.96  The system began initial operation on 27 January 2009 on a 
portion of US flights with a view to gradually extend operations to include all US domestic 
flights and international flights departing to or from the US.97 
 
Automated Targeting System 
 
The Automated Targeting System (ATS) is a screening system employed by US Customs and 
Border Protection which operates in a similar fashion to the original CAPPS system.98  News 
reports have credited the ATS with identifying Raed al-Banna as a potential terrorist and 
preventing him from entering the United States in 2003.  The New York Times, for instance, 
suggests that ATS registered al-Banna as having ‘“multiple terrorist risk factors”’.99  As a 
result, al-Banna was subjected to questioning upon landing at O’Hare airport and ultimately 
denied entry into the US.  Less than two years later, al-Banna’s fingerprints were allegedly 
matched to the hand of a suicide bomber who detonated a car bomb in Iraq.100 
 
ADVISE 
 
ADVISE was a national security programme that was designed to mine data from various 
databases and provide results in the form of visual analysis and provide suspicion alerts.101  
We have not found any information pertaining to the effectiveness or accuracy of the 
programme’s performance; however, the DHS discontinued the programme in 2007, citing 
its high maintenance cost and the availability of less expensive commercial off-the-shelf 
products which could perform the same or similar tasks.102   
 
Able Danger 
 
Able Danger was a data mining project of the US Army’s Land Information Warfare Agency 
that was carried out from 1999-2000.103  Their work had included analysis of the al Qaeda 
network.104  Following the September 11 attacks, several individuals involved with the Able 
Danger project indicated that their work had identified four of the individuals who 
participated in the plot.105  Specifically, Able Danger participants suggested that they had 
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identified Mohammed Atta ”and had him linked through associational activities to the blind 
Sheik and others operating in or around Brooklyn, New York.”106 
 
Summary 
 
This brief survey of public information relating to the performance of data mining in the 
counter-terrorism context reveals little in the way of hard statistical information.  The most 
extensive figures available pertain to the German terrorist Rasterfahndung.  These figures 
are not at all promising, but given that the exercise essentially consists of the application of 
an ethnic profile, the poor results are not a great surprise.  In the realm of US airline 
passenger screening, Rosenzweig has provided some potential figures for the number of 
positives these systems return.107  However, we do not know how reliable these are or how 
many of these “matches” represent legitimate positives that indicate that the system is 
performing as intended.  The saga of CAPPS II/Secure Flight, however, is quite telling.  Once 
the programme came under scrutiny, the original plans were scrapped.  Then, the successor 
programme, Secure Flight, which according to initial plans would require two years for 
development, ultimately required over six years once a number of conditions were imposed.  
Yet, despite the certification of the Government Accountability Office that the conditions 
imposed by the US Congress were met, no figures reflecting the performance of Secure 
Flight such as the percentage of false positives and false negatives have been made public.  
Isolated anecdotes of “success stories” may be found in media sources, but this handful of 
purported evidence cannot substitute for comprehensive performance data. 
 
3.4. Problems Relating to Counter-Terrorism Data Mining  
 
There are at least four significant issues that create difficulties for the use of data mining in 
the counter-terrorism context.  The first is the relative rarity with which terrorist activity 
takes place.  Two further issues are those of false positives and false negatives, which 
represent ways in which data mining fails the task it is supposed to achieve.  Lastly, there is 
the problem of poor data quality which can contribute to the failure of data mining systems 
to perform as intended. 
 
3.4.1. The Problem of Rarity 
 
In comparison to other events for which data mining has been used in the commercial 
context, terrorist acts are relatively rare in the Western world.  According to the RAND 
Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, 2006 saw a historic high in the number of 
instances of terrorist acts or attempted terrorist acts.  The Database records a total of 6,660 
incidents for that year.108  For the same year, it records one terrorist incident in the United 
States and four incidents in Germany.109  Europol’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, 
however, lists a total of 13 attacks in Germany for that year.110  In contrast, the Federal 
Trade Commission recorded 20,475 instances of fraud involving credit cards in the United 
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States in that year111 and over 60,000 instances of identity theft that involved credit card 
fraud.112  The German Bundeskriminalamt recorded 8,932 incidents of credit card fraud in 
Germany for that year.113  A particularly high incidence of terrorism in the United States is 
recorded for the year 2001.  For that year, the RAND database lists 36 incidents in the 
United States, one incident in Germany and a total of 1,732 incidents worldwide.  
Bundeskriminalamt data, however, registers 57,713 incidents of credit card fraud in 
Germany for that year.114 
 
Rarity represents a problem for data mining on a number of levels.  For instance, it 
represents a problem in terms of testing or evaluating the performance of any given data 
mining exercise.  In order to evaluate how well a particular data mining programme 
performs the task foreseen for it, one has to have a set of test data within which the 
expected values are known.  In this way, one would be able to identify which true positives 
were correctly assessed as well as identify the number of false positives and false negatives.  
Additionally, the test data need to be representative of the actual data to which the data 
mining programme will ultimately be applied.  When dealing with phenomena that are rare, 
there can be less certainty that instances of the phenomenon of which we have records will 
reflect future instances of the phenomenon which we want to identify.  It also means that 
less information is available on which to build models or profiles.115  Thus, we cannot have as 
much confidence in those models and profiles as would be the case with more frequent 
phenomena.  Some applications of data mining may try to compensate for the lack of certain 
data by extrapolating from existing data.  The rarity of terrorist events, however, makes this 
kind of extrapolation less reliable.116 
  
3.4.2. The Problems of False Positives and False Negatives 
 
Any discussion of the effectiveness of data mining will include reference to false positives 
and false negatives.  Broadly speaking, false positives represent results that are shown to 
meet our criteria but do not in fact represent the results we are truly interested in.  Thus, for 
example, if the task of a data mining programme is to identify terrorists, any individuals who 
are incorrectly identified as terrorists represent false positives.  Conversely, any terrorists 
within our data set whom the data mining exercise fails to identify as terrorists would 
represent false negatives.  Generally speaking, data mining algorithms can be tweaked to 
either minimize false positives or minimize false negatives.117 
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However, it may be impossible to ensure that the number of false positives reaches zero 
unless the test data used to set the algorithm are a very accurate representation of the 
actual data on which the programme will be used.  On the other hand, setting the algorithm 
to eliminate false positives may introduce more false negatives than are considered 
acceptable.  Thus, from the perspective of false positives and false negatives, counter-
terrorism data mining efforts will either point suspicion at innocent individuals or fail to turn 
up all suspects—perhaps even to a point that calls the benefit of the exercise into question.  
 
Security specialist Bruce Schneier and IT specialist Jeff Jonas together with policy thinker Jim 
Harper all criticized the notion that data mining could uncover terrorists.  All essentially 
relied on the absence of a well-defined profile due to the rarity of terrorist action and the 
base rate implications stemming from the large volume of data that would be mined in 
counter-terrorism programmes.  The rarity issue would entail that the number of true 
positives would be relatively small and would also prevent the reduction of the number of 
false positives to an acceptable number.118  Thus, Jonas and Harper argued that a 
programme with a low false positive rate of only 1% would find 3 million “terrorists” when 
applied to the entire US population of some 300 million people.119  Schneier, referring to the 
Terrorist Information Awareness programme,120 seems to assume that counter-terrorist data 
mining programmes would be working with various “event”-related data such as 
transactional data, e.g., credit card purchases, and communicational activities (e-mail, 
telephone calls, internet usage, etc.).121  He draws upon a hypothetical model to illustrate his 
point: 
 
We'll be optimistic. We'll assume the system has a 1 in 100 false positive rate 
(99% accurate), and a 1 in 1,000 false negative rate (99.9% accurate). 
 
Assume one trillion possible indicators to sift through: that's about ten events -- e-
mails, phone calls, purchases, web surfings, whatever – per person in the U.S. per 
day. Also assume that 10 of them are actually terrorists plotting. 
 
This unrealistically-accurate system will generate one billion false alarms for every 
real terrorist plot it uncovers. Every day of every year, the police will have to 
investigate 27 million potential plots in order to find the one real terrorist plot per 
month. Raise that false-positive accuracy to an absurd 99.9999% and you're still 
chasing 2,750 false alarms per day – but that will inevitably raise your false 
negatives, and you're going to miss some of those ten real plots.122 
 
Schneier, Jonas, and Harper also all refer to the use of data mining in other contexts.  
Schneier refers to applications to combat credit card fraud, Harper refers to marketing 
efforts aimed at generating additional sales, and Jonas and Harper refer to customer 
relationship management—another marketing function.  The authors cite these examples to 
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illustrate how the level of false positives is an acceptable cost in these contexts but not so in 
the counter-terrorism context.  We will discuss this point further in Section 5. 
 
Given the widespread claims of data mining success in private sector applications, it is all the 
more remarkable that comprehensive studies evaluating data mining performance in terms 
of false positives and negatives cannot be found.  One partial exception is a 1998 article by 
Abbott, Matkovsky, and Elder which seeks to evaluate the performance of commercial data 
mining software products that were among the market leaders at that time.123  Part of their 
evaluation involved testing the products’ performance in fraud detection.  Unfortunately, 
the authors do not provide a particularly thorough account of their methodology in 
assessing fraud detection performance: For instance, it is not revealed how many individuals 
or transactions were represented in the test data, nor are we told what the actual number 
of fraudulent instances were which the ideal software tool would pick out.  Clearly, the 
authors’ aims are to provide software procurement agents with an uncomplicated, 
comparative overview rather than a detailed, empirical assessment.  Nonetheless, some 
interesting inferences can be drawn from their discussion. 
 
The authors compare five data mining products, including two prominent products, 
Clementine124 and SAS’s Enterprise Miner, which are not unknown in the law enforcement 
community.125  For each of the products, the authors applied the product’s decision tree and 
neural network algorithms separately to the test data and recorded the number of false 
positives and false negatives with each application.  The results are interesting in that 
neither type of algorithm proved to be more effective than the other across the board.126  
For two of the products, however, the use of the decision tree algorithm reduced the 
number of false positives remarkably over application of the neural networks.  The authors 
explain this occurrence as follows: 
 
This is probably primarily due to two factors. First, most of the trees allowed one to 
specify misclassification costs, so nonfraudulent transactions could be explicitly 
given a higher cost in the data, reducing their number missed.  Secondly, pruning 
options for the trees were somewhat better developed than the stopping rules for 
the networks, so the hazard of overfit was less. 127  
 
The authors go on to note, however, that in other contexts they have found “the exact 
opposite performance.”128 
 
With respect to false positives in particular, there was significant divergence in performance.  
The worst performance had just over 20 false positives whereas the best performance had 
fewer than 5.129  As for false negatives, the worst performer correctly detected just over 40 
fraudulent transactions, whereas the best performer identified a little over 80.130  Again, we 
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are not told what the correct number of fraudulent transactions was, so we cannot assess 
how many transactions even the best performer missed.  Since the authors do not reveal the 
total number of transactions within the set of test data or the percentage of fraudulent 
transactions, it is also difficult to put these numbers into perspective.   
 
Overall, in terms of benefits, the programs had some success in identifying fraud however 
the authors had defined it within the test data.  Generally speaking, the programs returned a 
higher number of true positives than false positives.  However, in some instances the ratio of 
false positives to true positives was remarkably high and calls into question what true 
benefit these particular applications would bring to fraud detection efforts.  The authors do 
not reveal how much time was put into developing models and testing. This factor is 
significant if the use of data mining is to provide some time-saving benefit.  We also have to 
consider the time required to update data mining systems.  Frauds may change their 
techniques and practices over time, in some instances in direct response to deployed 
detection technologies. 
 
There may be methods for improving the rate of false positives and negatives.  David Jensen 
was one of the academics involved in DARPA’s TIA project, and in a 2003 article entitled 
“Information Awareness: A Prospective Technical Assessment”,131 he together with Rattigan, 
and Blau outlined an approach which likely reflects the aims of at least one of the 
programmes within TIA.  They argue that their approach would significantly decrease false 
positives in the counter-terrorism context.  There are three elements characterizing this 
approach which they discuss in the article.  The first is reliance on “relational” as opposed to 
“propositional” data.  In short, their approach would not simply apply analysis to a database 
of entities with certain properties.  Rather, relations between the entities would be 
discovered and defined, permitting subsequent analysis to take these relations into 
account.132  In other words, data mining would take place within social networks or 
networked transactions, etc.  The second element is reliance on ranking classifiers as 
opposed to a simple binary valuation.  Binary classification would classify each entity as 
either “true” or “false”, e.g. suspect or not suspect.  Ranking classification, on the other 
hand, would calculate the likelihood that an entity should be labelled as “true” in much the 
same way as a search engine may rank search results based on its model of determining 
relevance to a given set of search criteria.133  Ranking can play a significant role in research 
and analysis if the rank score or some visual representation of the rank score is available to 
the user.  That visual cue provides the user with an indication of the strength of the 
connection.  The third element of Jensen’s approach involves multiple, recursive applications 
of a data mining algorithm or algorithms to the data.134  As the authors point out, this sort of 
“multi-pass” method could even involve different sets of data for each pass or at least less 
data for initial passes.  In this way, the method could potentially provide a certain level of 
privacy protection by utilizing less personal or sensitive data for the initial pass.135  Ideally, 
the use of multiple applications of data mining algorithms would continuously narrow down 
results. 
 
The authors claim that testing with a system utilizing all three elements demonstrated that 
the second pass provided a significant improvement in the ratio of true positives to false 
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positives over the initial run.  For instance, their figures indicate that at a 10% false positive 
rate, the initial run had a true positive rate of approximately 50%.  At this level, however, the 
second run shows a true positive rate of nearly 80%.136  The level of superiority of the 
second run over the first run diminishes, however, both as the level of false positives 
increases and decreases.  Thus at a 3% false positive rate, the benefit may be only a 10% 
increase over the first run—and at this level, the true positive rate is less than 50%—and at a 
false positive rate of 1%, there may be effectively no benefit at all provided by the second 
run. 
 
It may be tempting to turn back to the critique of Bruce Schneier.  Does the test model that 
Jensen et al. have developed perform better than Schneier’s hypothetical data mining 
programme with a false positive rate of 1% and true positive rate of 99.9% which was the 
basis of his criticism?  The short answer is that Jensen’s model would not even remotely 
match Schneier’s ideal programme.  Additionally, the 2-cycle model referenced in Jensen’s 
article is obviously a very simple one.  It merely serves to indicate that the performance of 
the model can be improved through subsequent cycles of processing.  Jensen et al. appear 
to be inviting us to conceive of how much better a system would perform if it incorporated 
five, seven, dozens, or even scores of algorithmic passes.  Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that 
any system will be able to match or surpass the idealized programme that Schneier uses for 
his thought experiment.  Jensen may be likely to counter that Schneier’s model assumes 
binary output (e.g., suspect/ not suspect) as opposed to ranking classification or a suspicion 
score.  Regardless of whether Schneier did have a binary model in mind, it is ultimately 
irrelevant for his argument.  It does not matter how we define a “positive”—whether in 
terms of binary classification or rank score—false positives are a problem for both.  
Moreover, we do not know whether Jensen’s method performs the same in environments 
where 1 out of 100 items represent a positive as in environments where 1 out of a million 
items represents a positive.  A multiple-pass system would also inevitably involve the 
application of more processing power than a single-pass system.  That may make that kind 
of system unfeasible for some environments or applications. 
 
3.4.3. The Problem of Data Quality 
 
Another problem which data mining encounters is that of poor data quality.  Issues with the 
quality of data on which data mining will rely can take a number of forms.  Data may be 
recorded incorrectly due to human error.  For instance, someone may inadvertently invert 
the digits in a number when entering it on a form or a data entry clerk may misspell a name 
when entering data into a database.  Additionally, data may become corrupted through 
some form of computer error or a compatibility problem.  Data may also be missing due to 
the fact that it was unavailable at the time of entry or the person entering the data simply 
failed to fill out all the required fields on a form.  Methods have been developed to 
compensate for missing data, but the use of these methods may introduce another source of 
error. 
 
Problems in the quality of data within private sector databases in the US have been widely 
reported.  For instance, a small survey conducted by the National Association of State Public 
Interest Research Groups found that out of 197 credit reports from 154 adults in 30 different 
states, 79% contained some sort of error.137  Over half of the reports contained inaccuracies 
                                                     
136
 Ibid., pp. 7, Fig. 3. 
137
 National Association of State PIRGs, “Mistakes Do Happen: A Look at Errors in Consumer Credit 
Reports” (June 2004) at 13 & 16. 
  23 
with regard to personal information, such as misspelling of names, incorrect birth dates, 
outdated addresses listed as current addresses, or addresses listed where the individual had 
never lived.138  According to the report, some of these kinds of errors result from “mis-
merges”, where information about one individual is mistakenly added to a file pertaining to 
a different individual.139  Additionally, the report alleges that errors may also be traced to 
the failure on the part of credit reporting agencies to verify the identity of individuals when 
incorporating information from public records.  Thus, a bankruptcy filing submitted in the 
name of one John Smith may end up in the credit report of another John Smith.140  Once 
these errors are generated in a source database they can be propagated to additional 
databases including those maintained by law enforcement and other government agencies.   
As was revealed in D08.1, several data mining systems in the US that are used in the 
counter-terrorism context rely on data obtained from commercial sources.  One such source 
might be ChoicePoint (now LEXIS-NEXIS) databases, which the FBI has certainly had access 
to.141  Another data aggregation business, Axciom, may have been tapped as a potential 
partner for TIA or individual projects within TIA.142  These private data aggregation 
companies in turn obtain their data from a variety of public and private databases, likely 
including data from credit reporting agencies.  The spread of erroneous data among 
different databases also produces an issue for the rectification of that data; correcting the 
data in one database will often not result in the correction of the data in other databases.  
With the increasing proliferation of automated aggregation services,143 not only can 
erroneous data be further propagated, but these services may add new errors as well.144    
 
3.5. Summary 
 
Data quality and false positives and negatives raise issues for data mining generally.  More 
specifically, the relative rarity of terrorist events raises problems for modelling terrorist 
activity.  One message that can be derived from both the Abbott and Jensen articles is that 
false positives can be reduced.  Nonetheless, they will always be a problem.145  Abbott and 
other authors stress the importance of testing, modelling, and updating in order to develop 
data mining regimes that are reliable and effective.  Although in a few instances 
independent bodies have been invited to review the development of IT-based security 
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measures aimed at least in part to counter terrorism and have provided some 
documentation of their oversight activities, in the vast majority of instances there is no 
evidence that such programmes have received any testing of consequence.146  Detailed 
figures such as false positive and false negative rates have not been released to the public.  
We should also be wary of the assumption that a particular system will function more or less 
equivalently in the operational environment as it did in the test environment.   
 
In addition to a lack of comprehensive figures pertaining to the application of data mining in 
any setting, we noted in Section 3.4 above that there is little apart from isolated anecdotes 
to speak for the benefits of the application of data mining in the counter-terrorism context.  
We now turn to an assessment of the costs connected with data mining. 
 
4. Costs 
 
There a number of different classes of cost associated with data mining.  In the Introduction 
above, we mentioned a number of—to use a term from economics—“direct costs” 
associated with developing and implementing data mining systems in terms of financial 
costs, human resources, etc.  Opportunity costs of a negative kind may also arise when 
resources dedicated to data mining and following up on the analysis resulting from data 
mining prevents authorities from pursuing more fruitful counter-terrorism efforts.  In 
addition, there are costs that flow from the occurrence of false positives.  These include 
costs in terms of following up on false positives as well as costs in terms of the infringement 
of the rights of those implicated as false positives.  Furthermore, rights infringements may 
also occur even in the absence of false positives, depending on the privacy and data 
protection rights that may be recognized in the jurisdiction where the data mining takes 
place or where the subjects of data mining reside or are citizens.  We will divide these 
various costs into two groups for purposes of the following discussion:  those costs which 
accrue to government agencies and those which accrue to the subjects of data mining 
exercises—i.e. the impact in terms of human rights violations. 
 
4.1. Costs for Government Agencies 
 
As noted above, one way in which data mining exercises may create costs for the 
government agencies that rely on them is through the poor allocation of resources.  The 
German Rasterfahndung provides one example where the use of data mining had such a 
result.  As part of that exercise, numerous police officers and potentially other public 
servants throughout the country as well were reassigned from their usual duties to collect, 
compile, and analyse data for this profile-based search.  It is unknown to what extent the 
initiative interfered with the usual operations of those non-law enforcement agencies that 
were involved.  At least with respect to North Rhine-Westphalia, however, crime statistics 
suggest that time invested in carrying out the Rasterfahndung had a marked negative impact 
on law enforcement in other areas.  There, 600 officers were assigned to work on the 
initiative over the space of several months.147  During this time, there was an increase in the 
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number of common crimes such as muggings, break-ins, etc.148  Notably, in this instance, 
there was no specific terrorist threat that prompted the exercise.  It may have been possible 
to automate aspects of the Rasterfahndung to avoid tying up so many law enforcement 
personnel; however, even assuming this possibility existed, there would have been financial 
costs in terms of designing the system to perform these functions that would take the place 
of the time/attention costs of police investigators.  Moreover, as mentioned above, no 
terrorist suspects were identified as a result of the initiative.  There is also no indication that 
a looming terrorist threat manifested itself due to the failure of the Rasterfahndung, and 
whether the exercise had any deterrent effect can only be left to speculation.  Overall, the 
programme resulted in a net loss for public safety. 
 
There are of course also the financial costs of developing and operating data mining 
programmes.  It is difficult to get comprehensive figures for the cost of data mining 
programmes being applied for counter-terrorism purposes; however, numbers are available 
for components of the TIA project.  For the Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery (EELD) 
project, for example, budget statements indicate that 17.344 million USD were spent on the 
project in 2001,149 12.309 million USD were spent in 2002.150  In 2003, the budget 
projections for the years 2003 – 2005 totalled 32.332 million USD.151  Thus, at least 29 
million USD were spent on research and development for this component before funding 
was officially withdrawn by Congress and a total exceeding 41 million USD had been 
budgeted over a period of 4 years.  The TIDES and EARS projects survived Congressional 
defunding.  In 2002, 27.831 million USD was spent on those projects152 and 34.141 million 
USD was spent in 2003.153  At the beginning of 2004, an additional 46.332 million USD was 
allocated to the projects,154 suggesting that ultimately, over 100 million USD was disbursed 
on the projects.   
 
The ADVISE programme reportedly had an overall proposed budget of approximately 42 
million USD for the years 2003-2007.155  As noted above, this programme was abandoned 
due to the fact that development expenditures were no longer considered justified in light of 
the availability of comparable and less expensive commercial, off-the-shelf products.  Using 
off-the-shelf solutions will certainly avoid the kinds of development costs associated with 
programmes like EELD and TIDES and EARS.  However, it is likely to be a rare case where 
existing commercial products can perform the kinds of specialized tasks required in counter-
terrorism.  Additionally, there may still be service costs associated with the integration of 
the software into the agency’s operational environment as well as custom add-ons to 
address legal compliance issues that commercial users may not face. 
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Under certain circumstances, data mining can actually exacerbate the problem of 
information overload and lead to analytic impairment.  There are also data quality issues 
that do not stem from data entry errors, corrupted data, or omissions but rather from poor 
definition of the purpose of programmes and accompanying data as well as poor 
coordination among agencies that build and make use of the information environment.  As 
information becomes more widely distributed, whether as the result of automated services 
or deliberate sharing on either an ad hoc or systematic basis, there is the danger not only 
that erroneous information proliferates but also that information that was arguably correct 
to begin with is later interpreted in an inappropriate manner.  This problem can arise, for 
example, where systems that were originally “stovepiped” later become accessible to other 
organizations or agency units, but also where analysts who are authorized to add 
information do not know or contemplate how that information may be used downstream.  
In both situations, individuals who come across the data often will not know where that data 
comes from or why it is in the system to begin with.  Moreover, the mere fact that someone 
has received attention from intelligence or law enforcement may be taken as incriminating. 
 
A case in point is that of Maher Arar.  Arar is a dual Canadian-Syrian citizen, who was 
identified as a person of interest by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police  (RCMP) due to the 
fact that he had known associations with another individual believed to be affiliated with al 
Qaeda.  The RCMP requested of Canadian and US Customs that both Arar and his wife be 
placed on “lookout” lists and that they were “‘Islamic Extremist individuals suspected of 
being linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist movement.’”156  These notifications likely did not give 
the impression that Canadian authorities did not have any reason to arrest or charge Arar or 
his wife with any terrorism-related offenses.  Other information concerning Arar that 
Canadian authorities provided to their US counterparts prior to Arar’s stop at JFK Airport 
likely compounded the problem by including statements that referred to Arar as a “suspect”, 
“principal subject”, “target or important figure” and that suggested that Arar had refused to 
be interviewed by the RCMP.157  As the Canadian Commission of Inquiry that examined the 
Arar matter noted, in many instances, “no explicit caveats were attached to the information 
sent to the Americans.”158  Although Canadian officials later made it clear to FBI agents that 
they had yet to establish definitive ties to al Qaeda,159 at that stage, the FBI seemed 
convinced that Arar was a terrorist.160  As can also be seen in, for instance, the case of 
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Brandon Mayfield161 as well as other well-known instances, compounding circumstantial 
evidence can act to create a spiral of increasing suspicion, which over time, becomes 
increasingly difficult to overcome. 
 
The Mayfield case provides a notable example of how the use of technology can mislead 
human users.  As the OIG noted in its report on the FBI's handling of the case, the 
automated fingerprint matching system that the FBI employed was designed precisely to 
present the examiner with numerous candidates that most closely resemble the print of 
interest.  Thus, in an ideal case, the system would “find not only the source of the print (if it 
is in the database), but also the closest possible non-matches.”162  Thus, if there are prints 
which are remarkably close to one another, the system essentially returns those fingerprints 
that are most likely to confuse the examiner.163  The OIG thus concluded that “[t]he 
likelihood of encountering a misleadingly close non-match through an IAFIS search is 
therefore far greater than in a comparison of a latent print with the known prints of a 
suspect whose connection to a case was developed through an investigation.”164  The OIG 
interviewed one individual who had served for 14 years on the IAI Certification Board, which 
was responsible for investigating complaints of erroneous identifications by IAI-certified 
examiners.  This individual indicated that he had encountered 25 to 30 erroneous fingerprint 
identifications and all but one of those cases, involved the use of automated matching 
programmes.165  The OIG also described how a process of “circular reasoning” set in which, 
once Mayfield’s fingerprint was presented as a possible match, examiners looked for 
features in the latent print that could arguably be matched to Mayfield's print rather than 
remaining strictly on a path of analysis in the other direction – i.e. proceeding from the 
latent print to the possible matches.166  In other words, the OIG suspected that examiners 
allowed the suggested match to bias their analysis and interpretation of the latent print. 
 
The kinds of costs relating to analytic failures that are described here in many instances lead 
in turn to costs for individuals in the form of human rights infringements. 
 
4.2. Costs for Individuals 
 
In terms of human impact, there are at least two categories of risks which the use of data 
mining entails: one is the risk that security forces will take action against individuals 
implicated through false positives; the other is the inherent risk to privacy stemming from 
the collection and handling of personal data in digital form.  A third form of risk which may 
arise from some forms of data mining is the risk that innocent parties are drawn into an 
investigation due to links to terrorist suspects.  Related to the first risk is the danger that 
analyses delivered through the application of information technologies will prove too 
convincing or appealing for human analysts to view critically or otherwise “shortcircuits” the 
analytic process.167  Additionally, human bias may play a role in this process, whether 
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consciously or unconsciously, where technological solutions appear to confirm what one 
“knew all along”.168  Results presented by technology can also bias the reasoning process 
such that the analyst seeks out details to confirm the result rather than proceeding from 
facts to a conclusion.169  Bias may also lead in the other direction—where an analyst ignores 
a true positive because it does not conform to the analyst’s idea of a true suspect.  A report 
within the Future of Identity in the Information Society Project noted an instance in which 
the activities of a particular Goldman Sachs employee had triggered fraud alerts on several 
occasions, but the individual was not initially investigated since she did not belong to a 
“socio-demographic group” that was typically involved in money laundering.170 
 
Data mining is often used as a means of prioritizing attention.171  In this way, it focuses the 
scrutiny of analysts and investigators on particular individuals implicated in query results.  
Where this scrutiny concerns a false positive, the action, at the least, constitutes an 
undesirable infringement of that individual’s privacy.  In some contexts, it may also entail 
confrontation from security personnel, such as in the cross border context.  Data mining may 
also be used to aggregate data from various sources.  When this occurs, the aggregate data 
can provide a much richer picture of an individual’s personal life, family, financial affairs, 
interests, and activities than that data would reveal in distributed form even if it were 
publicly accessible.  Additionally, such aggregating functions can pose a greater danger for 
breaches or leaks of data as discussed below. 
 
Data handling risks include the risk of the exposure and transfer of data through both 
insiders—i.e. those who have legitimate access to the data—as well as outsiders—often 
popularly referred to as “hackers”.  The US Secret Service together with Carnegie Mellon’s 
Software Engineering Institute published a report on IT-related insider sabotage which 
references a number of instances in which insiders—often disgruntled employees or former 
employees—sabotaged private and public computer systems and misappropriated critical 
data or software.172  The recent Wikileaks compromise of information held on US Army 
Intelligence systems demonstrates how easily large amounts of sensitive data can be 
transferred beyond its intended setting when proper safeguards are not in place.173  Even 
civilian intelligence and law enforcement agencies have seen a number of high-profile 
insider breaches—such as Robert Hanssen (FBI)174 and Aldrich Ames (CIA).175  The problem, 
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of course, is not unique to the colourful realm of international espionage.176  And 
government agents who have access to sensitive data could potentially pocket much higher 
sums through a single sale than Hanssen supposedly gained through his many years of 
selling secrets.  Reportedly, black market websites already exist that offer a variety of 
personal data177 and there are even “legitimate” markets where foreign governments are 
willing to pay for data.178   
 
In addition to the intentional appropriation of data, data can also be exposed unintentionally 
through the actions of employees or contractors.  Particularly in the UK, there have been a 
number of high-profile incidents in which public sector data has been lost or stolen:  For 
instance, in 2007, a hard drive containing data on 5,000 justice ministry personnel was lost 
by a private firm.179  In that same year, two discs containing data on all claimants of UK child 
benefits that Revenue and Customs was attempting to send to the National Audit Office 
were lost in the mail.180  The private sector has also not been immune to data loss and theft.  
In both the US and the UK, there have been numerous high-profile data breaches involving 
commercial firms.  One of the most prominent was the TJX incident in the US, which 
concerned the appropriation of credit and debit card details by exploiting vulnerabilities in 
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the wireless networks of retail stores that were operating as part of the payment approval 
process.181  
 
Including friends, family, and associates of a suspect in the investigation of that suspect is 
surely a natural, logical, and well-established aspect of investigative methodology.  However, 
there is always the danger that investigators will place these other individuals into the 
category of suspects without a sufficient basis for doing so.  A frequent aim of data mining 
programmes used in the counter-terrorism context is to perform the task of link analysis—
revealing not only these associations but providing some indication or evaluation of the 
nature and strength of these ties.  It must be kept in mind that data quality issues can 
inevitably have an impact in this context: Incorrect or erroneous data may create false 
connections; but also missing data or limits on the scope of data included in analysis—
whether intentional or unintentional—may provide a much different picture of the strength 
and significance of relationships than would be the case if more or other types of data were 
considered.  For instance, one terrorist suspect, John, may have frequent communications 
with another individual, Bob.  However, John’s far less frequent communications with a third 
individual, Mary, may be far more interesting if it were also known that these 
communications closely correlated with known terrorist-related events.182 
 
The danger of guilt by association has been implicated in several anti-terrorism cases.  In the 
Brandon Mayfield case, the fact that Mayfield had represented a convicted terrorist in a 
legal matter, attended the same mosque that other convicted terrorists had attended, and 
had advertised his law office with a web service that had some purported ties to terrorist 
figures or terrorist organizations were all evidently considered factors probative enough to 
be included on the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant for his arrest.  In the case of 
Maher Arar, his acquaintance with a suspected terrorist was apparently the sole basis for his 
designation as a terrorist suspect.  Another individual in California was placed under GPS 
surveillance for a period of 3-6 months.  This individual’s association with someone to whom 
a suspicious web posting was attributed appeared to play a significant role in his being 
placed under surveillance.183 
 
Data quality issues of various kinds can also result in consequences for innocent individuals.  
One such problem is poor entity resolution.  Entity resolution refers to the process of 
establishing, for instance, that “Osama bin Laden” and “Usama Bin Laden” refer to the same 
person, that when Osama travels with a passport with the name “Robert Johnson” he is 
nonetheless in fact Osama bin Laden, and that Osama bin Laden, age 19 of Dayton, Ohio is 
not the same person as Osama bin Laden, age 42 of the United Arab Emirates and that 
neither of them is the Osama bin Laden who is likely to be on a watchlist.   
 
The problems of poor entity resolution have been particularly prominent in watchlist 
matching as applied in the field of aviation security.  Numerous failures in the system have 
been widely reported.  Mikey Hicks is one of many individuals who have the misfortune of 
sharing a name with someone who has been included on flight watchlists.  As a result, Hicks 
has always undergone additional screening at the airport, beginning at the age of 2 when he 
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was subjected to frisking by airport security personnel.  He was reported as being 8 years old 
in January 2010 and was still being routinely stopped at security at that time. 
 
The US television news magazine 60 Minutes claimed to have obtained a copy of the “No 
Fly” List that airport security relies upon in screening passengers.  The list was found to 
contain a number of common names, including “Robert Johnson”, “Gary Smith”, and “John 
Williams”.184  The news programme interviewed 12 individuals named Robert Johnson who 
confirmed that they have all had problems boarding flights.185  The ACLU has compiled a list 
of some of the names on the list and individuals affected by it.186  They include commercial 
airline pilots, former and current members of Congress, former government officials, and US 
military personnel.  Former South African leader, Nelson Mandela was also on the list until it 
was removed through an act of Congress.187   
 
Sister Glenn Anne McPhee, secretary for education of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops 
was also inconvenienced at the airport in the years 2003-2004.  She learned that the 
surname “McPhee” was on the list since a certain Afghani had used the name as an alias.188  
She reported routinely missing flights due to the extra security measures and was delayed 
“up to five hours” at a time.189  Only after the head of the US Conference of Catholic Bishops 
wrote a letter to Karl Rove, then Deputy Chief of Staff to President George W. Bush, in 2004 
were the issues resolved.  A 2005 audit by the Department of Justice Inspector General also 
determined that names that should have been included on the lists had not been.190  The 
Secure Flight programme was introduced in part in the hope of eliminating the kind of 
mismatches that occurred in the previous system that focused primarily on names. 
The current US passenger screening system, Secure Flight, has added gender and data of 
birth as additional identifiers in the hope of preventing the kinds of false identifications that 
have occurred in the past.191  Time will tell how successful the new system will prove in 
avoiding these kinds of problems.   
 
Data quality errors can also result through poor collection practices where the collection 
itself is misguided.  This can lead to systemic problems where persons and organizations 
mentioned in intelligence reports are more or less automatically incorporated into 
databases that carry actionable consequences—such as watchlists.  A recent report from the 
Inspector General to the U.S. Department of Justice describes how individuals related to FBI 
terrorism investigations may be entered in the FBI’s Violent Gang and Terrorist Offender File 
(VGTOF) and also how policies governing entries to this database changed repeatedly 
between 2002 and 2005.192  These entries are then made available to local law enforcement 
so that local police will be alerted during routine traffic stops or other encounters.  Similarly, 
the FBI’s consolidated terrorist watchlist, established in 2004, automatically feeds data to 
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numerous other databases, including the VGTOF.  Entries in the consolidated watchlist affect 
screening procedures for commercial flights in addition to other contexts.193   
 
An example of poor collection practices is illustrated by the TALON programme.   There, the 
purpose of the programme was to register and distribute information pertaining to threats 
to military installations.  However, what constituted a “threat” came to be interpreted too 
loosely.  Essentially any activity which sought to protest the existence or actions of the 
military or US involvement in war was deemed to be a threat deserving a report in the 
database.  Additionally, the system for inputting reports may have been too lenient for 
widespread information-sharing since reports were also accepted from the general public.   
 
A parallel development to the TALON system can be seen in the FBI’s targeting of certain 
civil society groups involved in protest activity.  Some of the activities of the FBI were picked 
up by the media and eventually the Office of the Inspector General of the Justice 
Department launched an investigation.  One of the primary factors that contributed to the 
controversial practice was the rather broad definition of domestic terrorism that the FBI had 
adopted.  For this reason, the OIG determined that FBI agents had not violated existing 
policies in classifying certain protest groups or particular individuals as “terrorist”; however, 
it questioned whether the classification was appropriate since it resulted in crimes being 
classified as terrorism, which one ordinarily would not associate with terrorism—including 
such things as vandalism and trespassing.  The OIG noted that “[t]he domestic terrorism 
classification had impact beyond any stigma resulting from the public release of [FBI] 
documents....  For example, persons who are subjects of domestic terrorism investigations 
are normally placed on watchlists, and their travels and interactions with law enforcement 
may be tracked.”194  In the course of that investigation, the OIG determined that several 
individuals implicated in the cases examined were placed on watchlists.195  The OIG also 
noted that placement on a watchlist can have consequences not only for the listed 
individual, but also for their associates.196   
 
With increased information sharing, poor coordination among different agencies also 
afflicted watchlisting efforts.  A 2008 audit of the terrorist watchlisting process that was 
conducted by the Inspector General to the US Department of Justice found that the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which reviews recommendations for terrorist watchlists, 
had incorporated information about individuals featured in intelligence reports from the FBI 
as well as information shared by other federal agencies without the knowledge of either the 
FBI or any of the other agencies concerned and in spite of the fact that none of the 
information was intended as a recommendation for inclusion of individuals on a watchlist.197  
Additionally, the audit also discovered that in some instances, FBI field offices were 
reporting watchlist recommendations directly to the NCTC rather than to FBI headquarters 
which meant that the quality control function which headquarters could provide was being 
bypassed.198   
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5. Weighing Costs and Benefits 
 
In assessing the benefits of the application of data mining programmes in the counter-
terrorism context against both the unavoidable and potential costs, it bears repeating the 
main findings that were mentioned in Section 3.4 above.  First, we have found little to no 
publicly available evidence demonstrating the efficacy of data mining programmes in the 
counter-terrorism environment.199  Second, the best documented example, the German 
terrorist Rasterfahndung, can safely be labelled a clear failure from the information that has 
been disclosed.  However, the Rasterfahndung likely represents a particularly poor 
methodology, and it is possible that better methods are applied in other data mining efforts 
currently in use. 
 
It is also important to recognize the differences between the use of data mining in the 
private sector and its potential use in the counter-terrorism context.  Some have wanted to 
point to the use of data mining in other contexts as an indication of its appropriateness for 
the counter-terrorism context.  Yet, as several authors have pointed out, in the commercial 
setting, the consequences of false positives for human subjects are often relatively trivial.200  
For instance, in the context of credit card monitoring, it would mean an unnecessary phone 
call from the credit card company to verify the authenticity of a particular transaction.  In 
the context of a marketing campaign, it might mean the receipt of unwanted junk mail or 
“spam”.  In the context of counter-terrorism, however, it could mean being barred from 
international travel or being placed under government surveillance or even arrested. 
 
There are also significant differences with respect to the benefits of data mining in the 
private sector as opposed to the counter-terrorism context.  A targeted marketing campaign 
may prove “successful” in terms of raising sales enough to more than offset the costs of the 
campaign despite the fact that a significant portion of those individuals targeted do not 
react to the campaign.201  In the anti-fraud context, data mining is used to prioritize 
attention.  It is accepted from the outset that 1) not all positives can be investigated, and 2) 
not all investigations will lead to a determination of fraud.202  Due to the large amount of 
money at stake, however, devoting resources to anti-fraud investigations makes economic 
sense.203  
 
The perceived threat, however, can play a significant role in the assessment of the benefits 
of data mining.  Some will argue that the potential damage from a terrorist attack could 
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reach catastrophic levels, far beyond that of 9/11—for instance, if terrorists detonated a 
“dirty bomb”.  From this perspective, so long as data mining can add even the slightest value 
toward the prevention of such an attack, its deployment is justified.  The real violation of 
human rights as well as the potential harms that might result may, in comparison, seem 
minor or even trivial.  This argument, however, does not reflect an accurate view of the risk 
of terrorist harm.  Estimates of the likelihood of such a serious attack place it as very remote 
although not impossible.204   This argument asks us to trade actual harm for the 
unsubstantiated possibility of avoiding an unspecified and hypothetical threat.  Moreover, 
such an argument could be used to justify all manner of injury to suspects since the scale of 
imaginable damage is limitless. 
 
The potential scope of the impact on human subjects that is associated with data mining is 
also particularly troubling.  Apart from the dangers of the unauthorized disclosure of 
personal data or use of the data for illicit purposes, many of the data mining programmes 
examined would involve broad collection and processing of data that in most instances 
would inevitably pertain to innocent individuals.  This aspect of data mining will be explored 
in more detail with regard to the implications under international law in Deliverable D08.3.  
Yet, the implication is that broad application of data mining more or less places everyone 
engaged in certain legitimate behaviour within the scope of investigation without any 
suspicion of criminal activity.  Some may respond to this argument by claiming that there is a 
kind of anonymity in the data flood.  In other words, those conducting data mining exercises 
will only be interested in that data which shows up in the results, and most individuals 
whose data is subject to data mining will not receive extra scrutiny or otherwise be 
inconvenienced.  We will discuss the legal merits of this argument in Deliverable 8.3.  In any 
event, from an ethical standpoint, it still represents the handling and processing of personal 
data without any level of suspicion and exposes those individuals to a variety of further 
privacy violations as well as adverse administrative decisions as discussed above.  More 
targeted applications of data mining that takes place within the context of an investigation, 
where the processing is carried out on data that was duly collected under appropriate legal 
standards, would avoid this aspect of indiscriminate data processing. 
 
Despite the poor performance of the Rasterfahndung, we discovered some anecdotal 
evidence of applications of data mining that showed promise; and absent the availability of 
studies of data mining performance, we are also left to speculate on an intuitive basis as to 
what sort of approaches might prove more effective and limit negative impact in terms of 
unwarranted privacy infringement.  For this purpose, we return to the typology of 
programmes that was introduced in Section 3.2 above. 
 
Discovery of terrorists and terrorist networks – As noted above, one method which has been 
proposed for catching or uncovering terrorists is through the use of profiling.  It is, however, 
unclear whether it is possible to come up with an effective profile or profiles of terrorists.  
Much attention has been devoted to al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism.  This focus may 
perhaps be appropriate due to the relative level of threat, but it could also bring with it the 
enhanced risk of discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity or national origin.  Such a 
system would have the result that individuals of South Asian or Arabic origin or of Muslim 
faith would be more likely to be subjected to increased scrutiny than others.  Since false 
positives are inevitable, this fact would also mean that more innocent individuals of South 
Asian or Arabic origin or of Muslim faith would be targeted than would be the case for other 
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classes of innocents.  Moreover, a profile that includes ethnicity or national origin as 
significant criteria can easily be circumvented by relying on operatives of a different 
ethnicity or national origin.205  In perhaps the most obvious setting where computerized 
profiling has been applied—aviation screening—data indicating ethnicity or national origin 
will often not be available.  Instead these systems would have to rely on factors such as the 
country of issue of the passenger’s passport and travel patterns as proxies for these 
characteristics. 
 
Behavioural profiling—which would include reliance on travel patterns—may pose less risk 
of discrimination on the basis of personal attributes (though there might still be a risk of 
indirect discrimination), but can be just as problematic in terms of infringement of the right 
to privacy.  Here also, there must be a relatively high correlation between the selected 
behaviour and terrorist activity or affiliation with terrorists.  Additionally, virtually every 
travel pattern could be linked to innocent behaviour.  Therefore, the true challenge for the 
efficacy of travel pattern profiling becomes an issue of whether the innocent patterns can be 
discerned from the non-innocent ones. 
 
Reliance on link analysis would appear useful in an investigatory setting when starting from 
a known suspect.  The dangers with this approach are that it can lead to an assumption of 
guilt by association or be used to cast a wider net of intrusion than might be justified by the 
circumstances.  Although particular emphasis has been placed on developing methods to 
discover previously unknown terrorist suspects or “sleepers”, it is important to remember 
that one lesson from 9/11 was that many of the individuals involved in the plot were already 
known to intelligence agencies.  With the exception of individuals who truly act alone of 
their own motives, even so-called “lone wolf” terrorists will generally have some contact 
with terrorist networks and often require it in order to acquire the capability to perform 
terrorist acts.  
 
Profile generation – The use of data mining for the purposes of profile generation may be 
more effective than some of the other methods of profile generation.  The Rasterfahndung 
profile and MATRIX terrorist factor were based on the assumption that other terrorists 
would share the same characteristics of a small set of terrorists associated with a single 
terrorist act.  Additionally, the method of selecting which factors were relevant for the 
profile appeared to rely on an intuitive approach, which must be regarded as arbitrary and is 
fraught with the possibility that human bias may play a role in the selection.  Data mining, on 
the other hand, when done properly, may hold the potential to discover commonalities 
among known terrorists in an empirical and unbiased manner.  Nonetheless, it suffers from 
the same issues of whether the applied methodology is sound as is the case with the use of 
data mining to perform the profiling itself. 
 
Risk assessment – Currently documented experience with the application of crime mapping 
and geospatial predictive analytics suggests that these approaches can prove effective for 
making decisions with respect to the allocation of resources.  Additionally, these methods 
avoid privacy issues due to the absence of personal data: these approaches target areas 
rather than individuals.   
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Communications analysis that aims to uncover communications relating to terrorist activity 
or planning specifically strikes us as a dubious approach.  Although software designed to 
monitor employee communications in order to detect disclosure of trade secrets, 
intellectual property, or other forms of disloyalty likely provides a commercially available 
analogy, we have not been able to find any studies that assess the performance of such 
software.  It is easy to conceive that programmes that rely on detecting the use of certain 
suspicious keywords would likely capture a large amount of innocent communication.  
Programmes which search for certain constellations of such keywords within a single 
message or a chain of message exchanges would likely prove more effective.  However, here 
again the problem of finding a reliable profile or model of a terrorist message arises.  
Additionally, planners of terrorist acts may use coded language in order to conceal the actual 
content of their communications.   
 
Preparatory acts monitoring represents a more targeted approach than, for example, air 
traveller profiling.  Purchasing a certain combination of chemicals which could be used to 
make a bomb would seem to be more highly correlated to terrorist activity than a certain set 
of travel patterns.  It would also be possible to establish the system in such a way that would 
minimize the impact on the right to privacy—namely by focusing on activities without 
consideration of the individuals involved.  Once activities that could reasonably represent 
preparations for a terrorist act occurred, investigators could then seek to uncover the 
persons involved in order to identify suspects.  From a practical standpoint, however, it is 
unclear how feasible such an approach would be since it would have to rely on a system of 
reporting where the reports would be submitted by, for instance, certain merchants.  A  
model would be the system of SAR submissions on the part of US financial institutions.206  
However, any model that relied on combining more than one sort of activity—for instance 
purchases plus money transfers—would likely need to rely on identifying information in 
order to match the activities to the same person.  An alternative to merchant reporting 
would be a system of mandatory registration, where the purchaser would have to tender 
some form of reliable identification and fill out a form that would be submitted to the 
appropriate authorities.  Yet, such a system may be too burdensome for purchases involving 
common household products that contain potential bomb-making substances.  
 
One area that has recently received significant attention from technology developers, 
security professionals, and critics is the use of automated video analytic technologies.  Often 
the aim of such proposed programmes is to detect “suspicious” or “abnormal” behaviour or 
the emergence of such behaviour.  Such systems may rely on machine learning to develop 
and improve profiles of suspicious behaviour and may depend on human input to “train” the 
system, where a user provides the system with feedback as to whether an event highlighted 
by the programme is indeed the kind of activity that the user is interested in.  These 
exercises amount to a kind of profiling and face the same sort of problems mentioned above 
in relation to profiling technologies.207  Machine learning, however, can present some 
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unique problems.  Often the user and in some instance perhaps even the designers will not 
know or be able to determine what sort of rules the programme is developing to distinguish 
suspicious behaviour.  Moreover, there is also an issue with regard to the level of 
sophistication of the learning mechanism.  When the system highlights an event as 
suspicious or threatening and is then given input from the human operator that the event is 
not of interest, simply revising the last rule that the system established may not resolve the 
issue.  It may be difficult to determine how much training the system will require before it 
learns to correct a rule that will generally produce correct results despite the fact that it is 
essentially off base.  Deploying such systems in multicultural environments such as 
international airports is problematic since behaviour that is “abnormal” or unusual in one 
culture may be “normal” or common in another.  Here also bias can creep in where the 
system is not trained on such diverse populations or the system simply inherits the bias of 
the trainer   
 
Analytic aids – It is difficult to assess those programmes categorized as analytic aids due to 
the lack of information on them as well as our inability to identify commercially available 
analogues.  Obvious dangers are that the aids will end up misleading analysts or that reliance 
on the aids will result in analysts failing to exercise critical thought.   
 
6. Conclusion & Recommendations 
 
Whilst there is little evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of counter-terrorism data 
mining, sweeping conclusions that disregard the particular context of different data mining 
programmes should be avoided. Whether a particular data mining programme is effective 
depends on a combination of numerous factors: what aims are sought, what methods are 
applied, the quality of the underlying data on which the analysis is performed, the amount 
and complexity of that data, the available processing power, the way in which the results are 
to be used, and the relative tolerance for false results.  We have attempted to assess 
different applications of counter-terrorism data mining in different contexts, largely on an 
intuitive basis.  However, comprehensive assessment of the methodology and approach 
behind a particular proposed application is critical.  Where a particular application takes the 
form of profiling, significant care must be given to ensuring that the model on which the 
profile is based represents a reasonable approach and rests on sound methodology.  In 
addition to testing of the efficacy of the profile, testing and assessment of the methods for 
updating the profile is also important.  Beyond the issue of evaluation, we believe some 
approaches to data mining will be better at limiting the impact on privacy than others.  For 
this reason we formulate a number of general recommendations concerning assessment of 
the technology and methods on the one hand and the limitation of the impact on the right 
to privacy on the other.208 
 
4. Governments should require rigorous testing of data mining products before 
implementing them for counter-terrorism purposes.209 
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4.1. Testing should be carried out on simulated data that reflects to the closest degree 
possible the forms and types of data to which the deployed product is intended to 
be applied. 
 
In conducting initial testing to determine a programme’s performance and efficacy, it is not 
necessary to utilize data relating to real persons.  By refraining from the use of real personal 
data, agencies can avoid unwarranted violation of personal privacy or applicable law 
pertaining to the processing of personal data and avert the risks that the data is lost, stolen, 
or misused.  Nonetheless, the data must reflect the types and character of data on which the 
programme is to be used in order for the testing to provide an accurate picture of the 
programme’s rate of effectiveness in the target environment. 
 
4.2. Testing should be performed by a competent body that is completely independent 
of the agency or agencies which would use the technology if it were to be deployed, 
and that body should possess the appropriate expertise in scientific evaluation and 
assessment methodology. 
 
There a number of inherent dangers where an agency conducts its own internal testing.  On 
the one extreme, assessment may merely take the form of a rubber-stamp process in which 
effectively no real assessment takes place.  Toward the other end of the scale, there are the 
risks that conflicts of interest or internal pressures influence the design of the testing or the 
observations or conclusions that are drawn from it.  Additionally, internal review of 
technology bears the risk that standards or benchmarks are established that would be 
deemed inappropriate or unsatisfactory by the broader community.  Those individuals 
involved in testing data mining programmes should possess the requisite knowledge of the 
issues in and accepted methods for the evaluation of computational systems. 
 
4.3. Ideally, results of tests involving deployed technologies should be published for 
public review so that citizens may assess whether the technology represents a 
worthwhile investment of public funds. 
 
The argument is often made that disclosing the results of tests and assessments would pose 
a threat to national security by providing terrorists with information that could be used to 
circumvent the counter-terrorism measures in question.  However, it is unclear how the 
publication of performance figures could undermine security measures.  At best, such 
numbers could give terrorists some notion of the chance of success at slipping through the 
system, but they would not provide any insight as to how to evade the system. 
  
4.4. Only those data mining programmes that can demonstrate their effectiveness in 
the test setting should be allowed to be deployed. 
5. Following implementation, programmes should be reviewed on a regular basis and 
monitoring mechanisms updated accordingly. 
 
Regular reviews can ensure that the system continues to function properly and effectively.  
Where automated monitoring against profiles takes place, those profiles should be updated 
regularly to reflect the current state of affairs and the emergence of new modi operandi. 
 
6. Governments should establish parameters for the types of data that will be subject to 
data mining programmes or exercises. 
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During the design stage and after a sound methodology has been selected, parties 
responsible for designing a data mining system should determine what types of data are 
actually required for the programme to effectively perform its function. 
   
6.1. Parameters should be based on the minimum amount and types of personal data 
necessary to conduct the analysis for the aims that it seeks to achieve. 
 
In order to limit potential infringement of the right to privacy, the use of personal data 
should be avoided wherever possible.  Moreover, governments should seek to minimize not 
only the amount of data that is to be subjected to data mining but also the number of 
different forms of data.210   
 
6.2. Where a data mining programme is applied to personal data, use of the programme 
should be confined to the greatest extent possible to investigatory applications 
centring on known suspects and endeavour to comply with traditional standards 
governing government intrusion into the private life of individuals. 
 
Limiting the application of data mining to known suspects could minimize the potential 
impact on innocent individuals.   Investigatory applications of data mining in this context 
could include such things as the analysis of telephone call data, cash flows, and travel 
patterns. 
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